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There is a quite intentional resemblance between the Cut Rule and Aristotle’s
Syllogism. In this paper some deep connections between Sequent Calculus and
Syllogistics will be investigated. Taking into consideration Álvarez & Correia’s
axiomatization of Syllogistics, currently the most complete available in the litera-
ture, I will show how this ancient logical system can be put into correspondence
with the structural features of a special Sequent Calculus system, SS. On the
grounds of this discovery I will present some improvements of the expressive
power of Álvarez & Correia’s system. As for the philosophical consequences of
the correspondence, I will give answers to several concerns Manuel Correia had
on his system. A somewhat new philosophical relevance of the Cut-Elimination
Theorem will be highlighted in the end.
Keywords: Sequent Calculus, Cut-Elimination Theorem, Theory of Oppositions,
Substructural logics.
1.1. Introduction
There is a rather obvious resemblance between the Sequent Calculus rule
dubbed ‘Cut’ and Aristotle’s perfect syllogism. These are not big news: the rule
Gentzen called ‘Schnitt’ was originally formulated by Herz in the twenties and
labeled by him precisely: ‘syllogismus’. Nonetheless, there’s more to the picture
than meets the eye, and the purpose of this paper is to show what that is. In the
following sections I will show an interesting correspondence between Syllogistics
and Sequent Calculus that exploits in a novel way the symmetry between Cut and
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the Perfect Syllogism. This will lead to a full formalization of Syllogistics by
means of a substructural logic called SS, with peculiar properties and an insightful
philosophical interpretation.
The pivot for this correspondence is the Axiom of Linkage introduced in
Álvarez and Correia (2012), so this paper may be seen also as an effort to deepen
the mathematical interest of their proposal. In fact, as I will show in due course,
the correspondence with Sequent Calculus ties up many of the loose ends already
recognized by Correia in some presentations of his work.
In section 1.2 I present the Syllogistics along the lines of Álvarez and Cor-
reia (2012). In section 1.3 the correspondence with Sequent Calculus is presented
and the system SS is defined and their most salient mathematical features ex-
plained. The philosophical consequences of the overall proposal are introduced
and commented in section 1.4. Appendix 1.6.1 shows some deviations from the
Aristotelian standards that open up the possibility of a further extension of the
system.
1.2. The Three Laws for Syllogistics
Syllogistics is a logic system developed both by Aristotle and the Peripatetics
and several other logicians over history2. In 2012, Enrique Álvarez and Manuel
Correia presented the currently most concise and complete axiomatization of Syl-
logistics, integrating mediate and immediate inferences with complete and incom-
plete terms3.
Before Álvarez and Correia’s system (hereafter called AC), the best known
axiomatization for Syllogistics consisted of six axioms that govern most, but not all
of the valid syllogisms. For instance, these six axioms are unfit for predicting the
validity of syllogisms with indefinite terms such as ‘not-A’, and they fail to recover
the validity of immediate inferences (conversions). The system AC provides a
unified solution to all these problems (for details see Álvarez and Correia (2012)
and Correia (2017)).
In what follows I present a slightly simpler version of AC and explain its be-
havior. The minor differences with the original system will be explicated along the
way.
2I intentionally avoid the use of the name “Aristotelian Logic” for Syllogistics, for this system is
not the perfect and complete discovery of Aristotle, pace Kant.
3Note that ‘axiom’ here should not be understood in the Hilbertian sense of unproved
propositional-or-first-order formula, but as a general rule stating a sufficient and necessary formal
feature for a valid syllogism.
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1.2.1. The System AC
Terms, propositions, quantities
A term is a variable that stands for a predicable expression in natural language.
If A is a term, we say that it is definite and call non-A its conjugate. I call the
‘non-’ compound of this term the conjugate-operator and the ‘A’ compound the
base of conjugation or simply the base. The conjugate of a definite term is an
indefinite term. The conjugate of an indefinite term is its base.
The interpretation of a conjugate term is evident.
A proposition is a sentence involving two terms in one of the following four
relations. Where α and β are terms (definite or indefinite), a proposition involving
them can be:
1. All α are β
2. No α are β
3. Some α are β
4. Some α are not β
I call these kinds of propositions. Following scholastic mnemonics I will call
these kinds A-, E-, I- and O- respectively. Please note that in the case of the latter
form the word ‘not’ belongs to the structure of the proposition and is not (for the
time being) a conjugate-operator over β.
A term in a proposition can be taken universally or particularly. For a given
term, the fact of being taken in one way or the other determines its quantity. The
assignment of quantity values follows the following rule, corresponding to Álvarez
& Correia’s Axiom of Quantity:
(A1) Axiom of Quantity:
1. The term α is taken universally in the propositions ‘All α are β’ and
‘No α are β’.
2. The term α is taken particularly in the propositions ‘Some α are β’ and
‘Some α are not β’.
3. The term β is taken universally in the propositions ‘No α are β’ and
‘Some α are not β’.
4. The term β is taken particularly in the propositions ‘All α are β’ and
‘Some α are β’.
5. To take universally (/particularly) a conjugate term is to take particu-
larly (/universally) its base.
Using superscripts U and P to denote the universal and particular quantity
respectively, the content of (A1:1-4) may be resumed as follows:
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1. All αU are βP
2. No αU are βU
3. Some αP are βP
4. Some αP are not βU
A proposition is called universal (/particular) if its first term is universally
(/particularly) taken.
Inferences, syllogisms
An inference is a tuple of more than one proposition. In every inference the
rightmost proposition is called its conclusion and the rest of them the premisses.
An inference is called a syllogism if it conforms to the following rule:
(A0) Formation Rule: The inference has three propositions and three terms, either
in conjugate or non-conjugate form, appearing twice but never on the same
proposition.
In a syllogism the term that appears only in the premisses is called the middle
term. It can be proved rather easily that the middle term always exists and is
unique.
A syllogism is valid if and only if it conforms to the following axioms:
(A2) Axiom of Particularity: There is no more than one particular premisse; and
the conclusion is particular if and only if one of the premisses is particular.
(A3) Axiom of Linkage: The middle term is taken once universally and once par-
ticularly in the premisses, and the quantity of the terms of the conclusion is
the same as in the premisses.
1.2.2. Comments
Both (A2) and (A1:1-4) were already known by the syllogistic tradition. The
clause (A1:5), relating quantity and conjugates, and (A3) have been presented in
Álvarez and Correia (2012) as their main contribution to the theory of the Syl-
logism (although primitive formulations of the latter may be found in works of
previous authors, for example, in (De Morgan, 1880, §42)). As Manuel Correia
has observed in some presentations of this work, the key part of their proposal is
(A1:5), which was primarily suggested by his collaborator, Enrique Álvarez.
This system validates all the syllogisms that are alike to be valid in the natu-
ral interpretation of the syllogistic system. As far as I know, the authors proved
this through a brute-force checking. A proper weakening of (A3) also yields the
syllogisms with problems of existential import.
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A technical virtue of this system is that it avoids much of the terminology
originally necessary to present the Syllogistics system properly. For instance, the
quality feature of propositions is disposable, as well as the distinction between
major and minor terms and premisses.
Given this last observation, the following improvement may be introduced.
Let’s replace the original definition of inference by this one: An inference is a pair
⟨P,C⟩ with P a multiset of propositions called the premisses and C a proposition
called the conclusion.
This new definition identifies, for instance, the valid syllogisms ‘All A are B,
All B are C, All A are C’ and ‘All B are C, All A are B, All A are C’, which
were in fact treated as different by the traditional syllogistic logicians.
In order to reflex the symmetry on the premisses I will adopt the tree-like
notation for depicting syllogisms:
All A are B All B are C
All A are C
Another virtue of the system is that it governs the so-called conversions or
immediate inferences; that is, inferences with only one premisse and no middle
term. The tradition recognized three sorts of these inferences:
1. (Simple) Conversion (Ω): the conclusion is of the same kind of proposition
than the premisse but with the terms exchanged. Example:
All A are B
ΩAll B are A
2. Contraposition (Σ): the conclusion is the same kind of proposition than the
premisse but with the terms exchanged and conjugated. Example:
All A are B
ΣAll non-B are non-A
3. Obversion (Θ): the conclusion has the same quantity than the premisse with-
out being of the same kind, it takes the same terms in the same order, but the
second one is conjugated. Example:
All A are B
ΘNo A are non-B
The definition of obversion can be more easily stated if one considers the qual-
ity of the propositions, but I preferred this most complicated version to stress out
that it is strictly not necessary to introduce that terminology. For these inferences,
(A3) must be read as follows:
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(A3’) Axiom of Linkage: The quantity of the terms of the conclusion is the same
as in the premisses.
Together with (A2) and under the dispositions of (A1), these three axioms
validate all the expected immediate inferences:
1. Simple Conversion: I- and E-propositions.
2. Contraposition: A- and O-propositions.
3. Obversion: The four kinds of propositions.
1.3. Sequent Calculus and the Perfect Syllogism
In this section I will be dealing with the standard apparatus for Sequent Calcu-
lus. For the sake of brevity, minor details on what is a sequent and how a derivation
should be constructed is assumed to be known. I use ‘⊢’ as the turnstile symbol and
consider sequents with series, not multisets of formulas at their left and right-hand
sides.
1.3.1. Linkage and Cut
Recall the bArbArA syllogism, the first of Aristotle’s Perfect Syllogisms (25b
30):
All A are B All B are C
All A are C
Using this notation the analogy with the CUT rule appears quite naturally:
Γ ⊢ A,∆ Γ′,A ⊢ ∆′
Γ,Γ′ ⊢ ∆,∆′
Specially if one reduces the contexts and relabel the formulas in a convenient
way:
A ⊢ B B ⊢ C
A ⊢ C
The most evident analogy here is the relation between the middle term and the
cut formula: both appear only in the premisses of the arguments. But it is worth
noting also that:
1. The formulas of the conclusion are on the same side of the sequent than on
the premisses.
2. The cut formula is once on the left and once on the right side of the sequents.
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These are the exact same dispositions of (A3) regarding the quantities of the
terms in a syllogism. This suggests the following correspondence between AC and
Sequent Calculus:
1. Terms are Formulas.
2. Propositions are Sequents.
3. A universally taken term is a formula on the left-side of the sequent.
4. A particularly taken term is a formula on the right-side of the sequent.
5. A syllogism is an instance of the CUT rule.
If this is correct, then the following correspondence between kinds of proposi-
tions and sequents also holds:
1. ‘All α are β’ is ‘α ⊢ β’.
2. ‘No α are β’ is ‘α,β ⊢’.
3. ‘Some α are β’ is ‘⊢ α,β’.
4. ‘Some α are not β’ is ‘β ⊢ α’.
Up to this point the sequent α ⊢ β is underdetermined by the propositions
‘All α are β’ and ‘Some β are α’. This is unpleasant, as for example the correct
instance of CUT
A ⊢ B B ⊢ C
A ⊢ C
Determines two valid syllogisms (bArbArA,bOcArdO/bArOcO) but four in-
valid ones:
Some B are not A Some C are not B
Some C are not A
Some B are not A Some C are not B
All A are C
(Counter-interpretation: A =animals, B =born in the desert, C =camels)
All A are B Some C are not B
All A are C
(Counter-interpretation: A =Albanian ports, B =on the Baltic sea, C =Chilean
Ports)
All A are B All B are C
Some C are not A
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(Counter-interpretation: A, B and C any three co-extensive predicables)
This is where the relevance of (A2) is highlighted: as a valid syllogism can
have only one particular premisse and the conclusion will be particular if and only
if one of the premisses is too, one cannot read the conclusion as an O-proposition
if both premisses are A-propositions, nor can we have an A-conclusion if one
of the premisses is of the O-kind. This immediately rules out these four invalid
syllogisms and in fact completes the symmetry between the valid syllogisms and
the proper instances of CUT. (A2) appears then not only as an axiom for the inner
validity of the syllogisms but also as a translation rule between Sequent Calculus
and AC4. This significant role of (A2) will appear over and over again in what
follows.
1.3.2. Adding indefinite terms
In order to fully capture AC in the Sequent framework we need to formalize








If ‘¬’ is about to stand for the conjugate-operator, then these rules should be
giving us some valid conversions. And they actually do: the four possible applica-
tions of these rules give us the four valid obversions of Syllogistics:
1. A,B ⊢ ¬ R
A ⊢ ¬B stands for
No A are B
Θ
All A are non-B
2. A ⊢ B ¬ R⊢ ¬A,B stands for
Some B are not A
Θ
Some B are non-A
3. A ⊢ B ¬ L
A,¬B ⊢ stands for
All A are B
Θ
No A are non-B
4. ⊢ A,B ¬ L¬A ⊢ B stands for
Some A are B
Θ
Some B are not non-A
Notice how (A2) makes mandatory the particular interpretation of 2 and 4. The
crucial symmetry here is that the rules for negation respect the clause (A1:5): “To
take universally (/particularly) a conjugate term is to take particularly (/universally)
its base.”
As we want the conjugate-operator to be involutive, we should also admit the
reverse of these rules instead of allowing multiple applications of the ¬ rules on the
same formula. This is a pernickety care, but I am perfectionist enough to assume
it.
Contraposition (Σ) is now obtained by a double application of the ¬ rules:
4As a matter of fact, not only (A2) is constraining the admissible syllogisms to be recovered up
from the derivations, but also (A0) is playing the same role.
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A ⊢ B
¬ R⊢ ¬A,B
¬ L¬B ⊢ ¬A
And this yields us the only two valid instances of Contraposition:
All A are B
Σ
All non-B are non-A
Some B are not A
Σ
Some non-A are not non-B
Distinguished, once again, by (A2).
1.3.3. The System SS
We are in position now to fully formalize AC within Sequent Calculus. The
resulting system will be called SS (after Sequent Syllogistics, not the Schutzstaffel),
described below.
Let L be a set of uppercase variables. The system SS is the set of all derivations
constructible from the following set of rules:
Where A,B ∈ L and Γ,∆ are sub-multisets of L,
1. The hypothesis rule: hypΓ ⊢ ∆ provided #Γ +#∆ = 2.




3. The two rules for ¬.
4. The reverse rules for ¬: Γ ⊢ ¬A,∆ rev ¬ R




5. The exchange rules: Γ ⊢ A,B,∆ Ex R




I allow the application of the Negation Rules over negated formulas but I will
never do it.
1.3.4. Comments
The exchange rules recovers the validity of the Ω conversions. And only the
E- and I-propositions validate it, as expected.
As we do not have weakness nor contraction, the number of terms in every
Sequent is always 2. This will give us Cut-Elimination in a very straightforward
(and almost silly) way: just replace every instance of CUT with a proper instance
of the Hypothesis rule. For instance,
A,B ⊢ ⊢ B,C
A ⊢ C
↝ A ⊢ C
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The most important feature of this system is that, as all these rules conform to
(A1-3), they produce derivations where every branching corresponds to a syllogis-
tically valid inference. It can be checked by brute force that it is also complete:
thanks to the limit of formulas in the application of the hypothesis rule, there are
only 12 interesting cases of it. Thus the number of interesting derivations (where
an ‘interesting’ derivation is one where ‘¬’ appears at most once in each formula)
is upper bounded and the checking process, although tedious, is happily finite.
It is nonetheless worth noting that SS is not perfectly correct, for it has some
derivations that cannot be read as instances of valid syllogistic inferences. I say
“perfectly correct” because it is not that some derivations correspond to invalid
syllogisms. As a matter of fact, this never happens, so the system in this sense is
minimally correct. But in some cases (A2) produces insurmountable inconsisten-





¬ R¬B ⊢ ¬A rev ¬ L⊢ B,¬A
This is an SS-valid derivation, but there is no sequence of valid syllogistic
conversions that corresponds to it. The reason is that, as the conclusion is a par-
ticular proposition, for (A2) to be respected across the derivation all sequents in it
should also be particular; but they are not, for ‘A,¬B ⊢’ is in fact universal. But
it still holds that every particular application of a rule recovers a valid syllogistic
inference.
There are other derivations that raise some suspicions. For instance, consider
this one:
hyp
A,A ⊢ hypB ⊢ A
CUT
A,B ⊢
That would correspond to the syllogism
No A are A All B are A
No B are A
This syllogism is inadmissible in AC (for they does not conform to (A0)), but
its validity according to SS is harmless, for even Aristotle accepted the validity of
inferences from false premisses:
It is possible for the premisses of the deduction to be true, or to be
false, or to be the one true, the other false. The conclusion is either
true or false necessarily. From true premisses it is not possible to
draw a false conclusion; but a true conclusion may be drawn from
false premisses. (Aristotle, 1995, 53b 4-7)
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But here’s a beautiful serendipity. I was working on an early draft of this paper
when I noticed that derivations like this are not only innocuous, but in fact they
can be used to provide an insightful improvement of the expressive power of AC.
Call the following propositions and their corresponding sequents as:
1. ‘No α are α’ (A,A ⊢): contradiction.
2. ‘Some α are α’ (⊢ A,A): existential claim.
3. ‘All α are α’ (A ⊢ A): tautology.
And allow for the weakening of (A0) in the following way:
(A0’) Permissive Formation Rule: The inference has three propositions and no
more than three terms, either in conjugate or non-conjugate form, of which
one must appear at least once in every premisse.
These changes makes admissible the consideration of the syllogisms corre-
sponding to the following (already SS-valid) derivations:
1. Syllogism with a contradiction:
A,A ⊢ Γ ⊢ A,∆
CUT
Γ,A ⊢ ∆
2. Syllogism with an existential claim:
⊢ A,A Γ,A ⊢ ∆
CUT
Γ ⊢ A,∆
3. Syllogism with a tautology (I):
A ⊢ A Γ,A ⊢ ∆
CUT
Γ,A ⊢ ∆
4. Syllogism with a tautology (II):
A ⊢ A Γ ⊢ A,∆
CUT
Γ,A ⊢ ∆
On closer examination this give us the following pseudo-valid inferences:
1. Syllogism with a contradiction:
A,A ⊢ B ⊢ A
B,A ⊢ and
A,A ⊢ ⊢ A,B
A ⊢ B
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The contrary or sub-contrary of the second premisse.
2. Syllogism with an existential claim:
⊢ A,A B,A ⊢
B ⊢ A and
⊢ A,A A ⊢ B
⊢ A,B
The subaltern of each second premisse.
3. Syllogism with a tautology yields an equivalent of the second premisse.
That is, we have recovered a major part of the Theory of Oppositions within our
framework.5 The remaining oppositions can be obtained by composition of these
ones in quite obvious ways. The contradictory of an I-proposition, for instance, is
obtained by:
B,B ⊢
A,A ⊢ ⊢ A,B
A ⊢ B
A,B ⊢
The morale here is illuminating: the Three Axioms of AC not only govern the
mediate and immediate inferences with definite and indefinite terms, but also the
Theory of Oppositions, an important part of traditional logic.
This insight is not mentioned in Correia’s work, so, as far as I can tell, it has
been presented for the first time here.
1.4. Philosophical harvest
In a conference given at the University of Chile in 2015, Manuel Correia pre-
sented AC and commented some open problems within his project.
For a start, he manifested some suspicions on (A2), based on his already suc-
cessful disposal of the Axiom of Negativity (from two negative premisses no con-
clusion follows). He considered to be an unpleasant asymmetry that only one of
these two Axioms were disposable, given their similarities.
On the other hand, he explained that AC already captures some propositional
inferences (Modus Ponendo Ponens, Tollendo Tollens and Tollendo Ponens), up to
5Notice that the only valid inference with A ⊢ A read as ‘Some A are not A’ is
A ⊢ A A ⊢ B
A ⊢ B
And this is an existential invalid inference that, as far as I know, has not a special name. Still,
interestingly it recovers a mixed aspect of the invalidity of subalternation and contrariety:
All A are B
Some B are not A
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a proper extension of the notions involved in (A1-3) (cf. Correia (2017)). This sug-
gests that the whole (classical) propositional logic may be successfully captured
by this extension of AC, thus contradicting the modern prejudice that Syllogis-
tics is an incomplete fragment of predicate logic (an apparently interesting result




has the problem that the conclusion term B appears not in the premisses and thus
it cannot be said to be governed by (A3) in a straightforward way.
These concerns may be resumed in three questions:
1. If (A2) is necessary, why is it so?
2. Is it possible to extend the three axioms (A1-3) over modern mathematical
logic?
3. What is the relation between the instances of explosion and (A3)?
The correspondence between SS and AC suggests the answers to these ques-
tions. As we saw in section 1.3, (A2) is mandatory for the proper translation from
SS back to AC, and thus its full meaning can only be acknowledged once the cor-
respondence has been established. Correia’s suspicions were justified, for he had
not considered SS and thus was unable to fully comprehend the role that (A2) was
playing within his system.
On the same line, the fact that axioms (A1) and (A3) correspond to structural
properties of Sequent Calculus suggests that both modern logic and Syllogistics
are governed by the same geometrical properties, which may be properly charac-
terized as a certain kind of symmetry. This symmetry reveals itself as grounding
both the CUT rule and the Axiom of Linkage without any conceptual priority, thus
showing that the common notion should be seek beyond the realms of Syllogistics
or Sequent Calculus.
As for Explosion, there are some things to be noticed. To begin with, one must
recognize that the conformity with the rule (A0) aligns Syllogistics with Relevant
Logics, because it explicitly states the condition of relevance between terms of the
propositions. If this is correct, then one shall expect, rather than regret, the failure
of Explosion6. As a matter of fact, AC can be fully recognized as a Paraconsistent
Logic, for SS invalidates the Meta Explosion scheme (cf. Barrio et al. (2019)):
Γ ⊢ A,∆ Γ′ ⊢ ¬A,∆′
Γ,Γ′ ⊢ B,∆,∆′
6That Aristotle’s logic is classical is far less an expectation of the aristotelians than it is of clas-
sical logicians.
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When B ∉ Γ ∪ Γ′ ∪∆ ∪∆′.
Besides Correia’s problems, system SS is philosophically interesting on its
own. When considered in isolation, it is a rather silly system, with poor structural
properties and a trivial Cut-Elimination theorem; and yet, once one considers its
correspondence with AC, its blatant philosophical relevance is highlighted. I see
this as abductive evidence in favor of the development of weird substructural logics
for more than mere mathematical curiosity.
And yet one more word on SS’s Cut-Elimination. Albeit this result is quite
uninteresting from a mathematical point of view, I think that it has an interest-
ing philosophical significance: it shows that one learns nothing from syllogisms.
Logic is, so to speak, strictly analytical. This follows the spirit of logic as a toolbox
for thinking, the organon of the Peripatetics. Being the syllogism the only rule of
inference of Syllogistics, the possibility of its elimination reveals a fine aspect of
Aristotle’s logical subtlety.
1.5. Conclusions
In Álvarez and Correia (2012) is presented what is currently the most com-
plete axiomatization of Syllogistics. In this paper I showed that the key concepts
involving that system can be put into correspondence with the structural features of
a special Sequent Calculus system, SS. On the grounds of this discovery I proved
that the system of Álvarez and Correia (2012) not only covers mediate and im-
mediate inferences with definite and indefinite terms, but also can be extended to
recover the Theory of Oppositions, a major part of ancient logic that was neglected
by the original proposal. As for the philosophical interpretation of the system, I
showed that most of the concerns Manuel Correia had on his system can be an-
swered within this new framework. In the end, a somewhat new philosophical
relevance of the Cut-Elimination Theorem was highlighted, on the grounds of its
relation with Syllogistics.
1.6. Appendix
1.6.1. Beyond the Aristotelian realm
System SS can be extended beyond the realm of standard Syllogistics. In this
appendix I will present some preliminary results on these extensions.
One natural question about SS is whether one can introduce connectives such
as conjunction and disjunction. As a matter of fact, either the rules of weakening or
additive left-hand conjunction introduction and right-hand disjunction introduction
are compatible with the AC correspondence, for they produce truth-preserving syl-
logisms with complex terms. For instance, given the validity of the corresponding
syllogism for
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A ⊢ B B,C ⊢
A,C ⊢
One can weaken (before or after the cut) on both sides harmlessly, given that






And this is still a valid syllogism:
All A are B
All A and D are B
No B are C
No B are C and E
No A and D are C and E
Where the conclusion is valid up to simple conversions (Ω).
The problem with weakening on the empty side of a sequent or the usual rules
for right-hand conjunction introduction or left-hand disjunction introduction is that




Some A are B
Some A or B are not C
But all the counter-examples to these common rules that I’ve encountered
have to do with the ambivalence of α ⊢ β as either an A-proposition or an O-
proposition. For instance, weakening on the left for an E-proposition gives a beau-
tiful ex falso quodlibet syllogism:
B,C ⊢
B,C ⊢ E
No B are C
All B and C are E
As a matter of fact, in the fragment of SS where the left-hand side of the se-
quent cannot be empty, everything seems to be working fine and the complete
additive group of rules for conjunction and disjunction can be introduced. Note,
however, that within this subsystem there are no particular propositions. This re-
inforces the suspicion that Particularity seems to be playing a major role in the
inheritance of the weaknesses of Syllogistics by Sequent Calculus.
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